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Can

I NT E R NA T I0 NA L

International refugee law rarely determines
how governments respond to involuntary
migration. States pay lip service to the
imporlance of honoring the right to seek
asylum, but i n practice devote significant
resources to keep refugees away from their
borders' *lthough the advocacy community
invokes formal protection principles, it
knows that governments are unlikely live
up to these supposedly minimum standards.
The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) shows similar
ambivalence about the value of refugee law.
It insists that refugees must always be able
to access dignified protection, even as it
gives tacit support to national and
intergovernmental initiatives that undermine
this principle. So long as there is
equivocation about the real authority of
refugee law,
states will
feel free to treat refugees as they wish, and
even to engage in the outright denial of
responsibility toward them.

Ironic though it may seem, I believe that the
present breakdown in the authority of
international
refugee lawisattributable to
its failure explicitly to accommodate the
reasonable preoccupations of governments
in the countries to which refugees flee.
International refugee law is part of a system
of state self-regulation. It will therefore be
respected only to the extent that receiving
states believe that it fairly reconciles
humanitarian objectives to their national
interests. In contrast, refugee law arbitrarily
assigns full legal responsibility for
protection to whatever state asylum-seekers
are able to reach. It is a peremptory regime.
Apart from the right to exclude serious
be made
criminals and Persons who Pose a security
relevant again?
risk, the duty to avoid the return of any and
all refugees who arrive at a state's frontier
takes no account of the potential impact of
refugee flows on the receiving state. This
- BY JAMES C. HATHAWAYapparent disregard for their interests has
provided states with a pretext to avoid
international legal obligations altogether.

Tlzefollowi~zgessay is based on a sinzilar
dic~lssioizthat appeared in World Ref~~gee
Survey 1996 (O 1996 U.S. Comnzitteejor
Refugees). Publication is by permission.

The Demise of Interest-Convergence

Much o l ~ h debale
e
during the dralting ol
the Refugee Conven~ion[of 19511 was devoled
to how best to protect the nalional sell-inieres~
d receiving stales The Convention grants staLe:.
wide-ranging aulhorii)~io deny relugee stalus 10
criminals and persons perceived to endanger
national security Perhaps mosl lundarnenially,
there was agreemen1 111ai internalional relugee
12, aiould not impose a duty on slates pelmanently to admit all refugees who arrive at the~r
borders. Instead, refugees are lo be alforded
prolectlon against r.cfo~ilcn~ent.
States are
required only to avold returning refugees to an
ongoing risk of persecution. If and when the
nsk of serious harm ends, so too does refugee
stat~ls.In this sense, refugee law is clearly based
upon a theory ol iemporary prolectlon.
The absence ol a duly to grant pelmanent
residence to refugees was cri~icallo the successful negotiation of the Convenlion. Wh~lewilling
to protect refugees against return to persecu11011, states demanded the nght ultimately to
decide which, if any, refugees would be allowed
to reset~lem thelr ternto~ies.While [he refugee
flows ol post-war Europe were fel~to be Iog-lstlcally and politically ~mpossibleto stop, the lorma1 distinction between refugee status and permanenl residence reassured siales that the~rso1~ereign authority over immigration would be
Desp~tethis legal prerogative to adm~t
refugees only as telnporaqi residents, many
developed states in~tiallybelieved their domestic
inlerests would be sewed by granting permanent resldent status to relugees. Because
relugees seeking proleclion in the years followlng the Second World War were of European
stock, their cultural assi~nilationwas perceived
as relat'vel~stralghifolward Refugees
helped to meet acme post-war labor shortages.
The reception of relugees opposed to
Communist reg-lmes moreover reinforced ihe
ideolng-lcaland strategic objectives of the capi[ahst world. This peniasive interest-convergence
belween refugees and the governments of
industrialized states resul~edin a pattern ol generous adm~ssionpolicies.
The reasons that induced this openness io
the arnval of refugees have, however, largely
who jeek enL1?rLo
withered away Most
developed staies today are lrom the poorer
countries of the South: [heir "different"racial
and social profile 1s seen as a challenge to the
cultural cohesion of many developed slates. The
economies of industrialized slates no longer
require substantla1 and indiscriminate infusions
ol labor. Nor is there ideological or slrategic
value In the admission of most I-efugees. To [he.
coixrary, governmenu more often view ref~lgee
proteclion as an irritant LO political and econoinic relations will1 the slate of origin.
In these circumstances, il 1s not sui-prising
that govenlmenls have rejecied the log~cof con-

Politics of N~u-Entrke
llsualrules ol imrn~grationconl.rol. S~aleshave
ncti, ho\ve\ler, responded by revel-ling lo [he
~ ~ [ u z Convenlionk
ee
duly to admil relugees
o~~~)~;cmpora~-lly
Suclz a pohcy shli~was 1210
po,ccl Ihy No~uial~,
but he governrnenis of rnosl
,,lhcl ~udusiriallzedcounlnes have lnsiiiuted
lcluporaly prolection only on a siiuation-speciiLC bas~s.
This resistailce io l.realjng lcinporary proteclioll ni [he noini 1s partly explained by deeply
mgnu~?ecl
policy preierences in ~1.aditionalcoun111~s01- immigralio~n,such as the Un~teclSva~es,
1 ~jnada,and iiustl,lha Any allernpl to cnd [he
low routme lmkage between reiugee Llauus and
1 pe1111a11eii~
les~denceIn llzese slales ~vould
1 ;,auue lu~~darncnlal
arnelzd~nen~s
lo doineslrc
1 lm;rugrallon legsla~loizbu~ltup dun~zg[lie era
oi openness to Cold War ~riugees\Vhile
Eu~opeangovclnmenti have hs~onsallybeen

I

I

I

I res~deizts,~lleyale concei,ied

Iiistead ol einbracing rhe Relugee
Conveniion's solutron oi iempoi-aryproteelion,
[he response of developed slales to [he end of
llze inlerest-convergence between I-elugeesand
receiving sLales has been lo avoicl 1-eceivi~zg
claiins to refugee slatus aliogethei-. Mosl
Norllieni stales have implemenl.ed non-eniree
mechanisms, including visa requlrerneizLs on ~lze
nal~onalsol refugee-pl-oducingslates, cainer
sanctions, burden-shifliizg arrangements, and
i o 1-elugees
~~
at Sroneven [he Corcible ~ n ~ e r d i c l of
~ i e and
~ s ill ln~emalionalwaters. The s~mple
pu~poseol noiz-eniree slrategies is io k e p
relugees mvi~yfronl11s
Non-c~itrteis an explicable, il reprehensible,
response lo lie breakdo~mof [he social and
polllical condilions illat previously led induslrialized stales to ass~milalerelugees. Seeing no
need to accepl the risks assumed to lollow firom
a generalized lemporaiy proteciioii system,
stales have laken the more b~utal(yet less !miI~le)step ol keeping refugees as far away as possrble lroin tlzeir territories.

w t h cnsunng thal
Lcml2orai-y protection ol ~ e f ~ ~ gcan
e c slruly be
biought to an end When la~gescale gueslworl\€1 plogiams closed down in tlze 1970s, [here
ivele still nearly 12 rn~llion'ten~porary'ieslThe "Right to Remain"
dents li\rmg In \Vestem Eulope The guestrvorkI ers' soc~aland veisonal auachments lo thelr
host slates made dcportat~ona pohtlcally unreNorthern go\wnments have I-ecenllyextendallstic optlon, Corc~~ig
govelnlnents ulornatel)~to
ed their pi-opl-rylacticprogram by clzanzpioning
allon7 them to remam European policjmalte~s
the refugee's "riglit to remain" in his or her own
\\wry thal a generalized Lemporaly proteciion
slate. The "iiglzl to remain" Is supedicially
system ior reiugees would similarly be no more
attractive. Af~erall, dze besl soluuon to ihe
11lan"a slow way of saying yes" to pennanenl
reiugee problem is ob~iousljrto eraclica~eihe
admissiolz.
harms that produce the need LO escape. It 1s
The vlab~li~y
of temporav protecllon as a
such a seductive notion that even ilze UNHCR
\\lay of reconciling the needs ol relugees lo he
has joined 1n the call lor a 1-edefinitionoi
lrailonal inlerests of rece~ringslales has no[,
refugee proiection to locus on m h a ~die Repoi~
however, been seliously explored lo dale. This
of tlze United Nauons I-liglz Conzmission for
is because goveinlnents of the incluslr~alized
Refugees (1995) called "prepai-edlicss,preven\\~orldhave new options lo PI-even1reiugee
lion and solutions."
In reahly, however, no inlemational commilflows from challe~&ng their sovereign aulhoiity
ovcr immigr-allon.S ~ a l unow believe hat
nzen~exisls lo deliver dependable in~eniention
tech~iologies
to aitacli [he root causes of 1-efugee flona, clearly
- of border control can prevent most
i asylum-seekers l1.on1 ever reaching tlzeir
a co~zdi~ion
precedenl lo the exercise oi any
i teiiilories. The), also see promise in the kind ol ge~zuinevlghi lo remain. Theie is no credible
~n-count17in~el-\ienlioiz
uudei-~altenm Iraq and
evidence [hat intei\7en~ioiznil1 ever e\iol\.e inlo
/ Bosnia, which prevented u~oulcl-berefugees
more than a discl-eiiona~;\i
1-csponse to the
nzi~zorii~l
oi refugee-generating situations tlzai is
horn even leaving [heir o\m skates, 111 sum,
go\iernnlenls tocla)i see iiillc reason to accepl
of direc~concer-n10 po\\~erlulstates. The inter[he co~iipromises~nlzereiilin llze Relugee
veniions 11-1both Iraqi I<urdis~anand i11 ~ l l elorCoi~veiz~ion.
Since legal duties lo refugees arise
nier Yugosla\1ra were responses Lo die clear ~isli
only once refugees successfully access a slate's
ol rehgee llows [oivalcl tl~edc~~cloped
wol-Id. Ivlost
i jurisdiction, why 1101 slnzply kccp relugees at
pern~ciouslj~,
these lrvo examples of inieiv-enlion
1 amzs-lenglh? Wliy depend on in~e~-ma~io~~al to enloi-ce tlze "rigl-tt LO remain" suggest that this
so-called "rigli~"is csselzlially a i~ieailsto i-atioIn\,v'stemporary proteelion regime in s a l e p ~ r d
souerelgz a~~~hoi-ity
over imnzigralion IS il is
~~alize
denying al-~islipersons 11112opiion io flee.
possrble simply to p~-e\lentllle arrival ol
\\)as ineslricably lied to
Each UN m~e~n~enlion
rclugees in the l~rslplace? Go~~evnmenls
border closures ~lialleft 110 147ajr lor ~x7ould-be
lllcreas~nglydeal wiih relugees on a harsh ancl
relugees io access meani~zglulsafety abt-oacl.
) ~~nregula~ed
hasis because h e y see inlernationnl
relugee lawk mechanisin LO reco~zcilestale
Inleresls to relugee inlerests as an anachl-o~zism.
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Relegation of Burdens to the South
Thrs blu~zlassault by the L\loi-th on reSugee
in~gi-alionhas I-einiorceclthe conhnernent ol
mosl of the worlds refugees to their I-egons of
origin ill the Sou~lz.Alrica shelters inore than
double [he number ol refugees protected 111 all
of Europe, North America, and Oceania cornbined. The Ivory Coast alone protects nearly
twce as rnany relugees as al-e presently in [he
Unlted States oi Anzerica. 111 desperately poor
counlries like Jordan, Djil~out~,
Guinea,
Lebanon, and Annenia, the ralio ol relugee
pop~~lalion
lo total population is about 1 : l O . Vet
refugee law establishes 110 burden-sl~allllg
~nechariismto offset tlze elzorrnous conil?butions made by ~i-resereceplion states of the
South.
Some degree ol solidarily is achieved by
"good oflices," UNIHCR assistance, nd I~oc
regmes sucl-r as [.he Comprelzeiimre Plan oi
Ac~ioulor Indochinue Refugees, and tlze like,
Bui because these eflorrs are orchestra.led outside intemalional relugee law, m tlze realm of
d~scretionor voluntarisn-r,there are few g~1aii111tecs of meanillgiul suppol? for the states of the
South. \?/it11 asslstance il-om the developed
n~ol-ldnormally provided afier the fact and on a
situation-specil~cbasis, Southern governments
are increasingly turning away from tradiliom or
hosp~tahtjitoward refugees. Wlde h e y normally lack [he resources and sophisticated border
control systems used by the Nortlz to enioi-ce
~~oll-elzti-ie,
the goveminents ol less developed
countnes have coerced ref~lgeesto retuln LO
their countnes of orign Some also engage in
absolutei~iblunt denials of access, such as [lie
decision by Zaii-esimply to close its border to
Rwandan relugees.

Principles for a Mew Bamdigm
of Refugee Protection
International refugee lawi un~lateralimposiLion of absoluie responsbility on the asylilni
skate 1s no1 problen~aticis, as durlng tlie posiwlr era, there is a peinrasive m~er-es~-conlcrgeizce 11etween reiugee and Iiost populations.
Absent suclz a natural sysnrneuy ho\vever,
reluge? law can function only IC tlzere is a meclianism in place lo mitigaie h e bui-dens ol receii7irig stales. The plight ol Taizania - laced ~ v ~ t l l
massive. immediate. ancl poientially deslabill=i ~ i grefugee flows h-om R\\randa and Gul-undi raises starlily the absurdi~yof a relugee protectloiz regime in nihlch obhgatioizs XI-cno[ ailjusted lo take account ol crrcumstances in staies ol
destiuation. While less pi-okound. the pelrzeivcd
impact of r e l ~ ~ gflo\.\is
w on societies iri indusi~ialized counlnes ough~also lo be iac~orcclinio
~ h pmlcction
c
equation Rciusal 10 balance i l ~ e
claims of rel~lgeesLVI\~I
[hose of receiving staies
siiilply iizviles 2 conlinua~ionof present irelids
to\\inrd c11bloc denials oi access.
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The time is right to focus on presenlng the
essence of international refugee law as a system
for the protection of persons whose basic
human rights are at risk in their own state, until
and unless it is possible for them to return in
safety and dignity A reformulation of the mechanisms of refugee law should be dedicated to
securing this fundamental goal, taking into
acco~intthe real circumstances of an increasingly self-interested world. Four basic principles
are suggested to govern this transition.
First, refugee protection should not be
bartered away as pan of the current upsurge of
interest in addressing the "root causes" of involuntary migration. While intervention may or
may not evolve as a more practical and globally
accessible answer to human rights abuse,
refugees ought not to be guinea pigs in that
ex-enment. Until and unless there is a dependable response to the risk of human rights abuse,
the autonomous right to seek protection outside
the frontiers of one's own state should not be
compromised.
Second, we should be open to the
enhanced flexjbility that a robust system of
solution-oriented, temporary protection could
provide. To be attractive to states, temporary
protection wll need to be constructed with a
strong emphasis on preparation for return.
Return itself will be a realistic option only if
supported by an empowering process of repatriation and development assistance. So conceived, temporary protection could regularly
regenerate the asylum capacity of host states.
To advocate the value of temporary protection is not to argue that immigration is bad: it is
simply not the same as refugee protection.
While the admission of outsiders to permanent
residence in a state may be a matter of legtimate debate for each country's body politic, the
basic protective role of refugee protection
should not be a captive in that debate. Simply
put, the human rights function of refugee law
does not require a routine linkage between
refugee status and immigration. If the protection of refugees is both durable and respectful
of human dignity it need not be permanent.
Dignified temporary protection is not simply a
matter of meeting the minimum standards set
by international human rights instruments, but
rather requires full respect for the needs and
reasonable aspirations of refugees. It must also
be finite. It would not be reasonable to allow a
"temporary" protection regme to force refugees
to wait indefinitely before being allowed to
rebuild their lives for the long-term. If it incorporates these critical safeguards, temporary protection can be a meaningful response to involuntary migration.
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Third, we ought to dispense with the
Refugee Convention's unnecessarily rigd definition of state responsibilities. Beyond a common
duty to provide first asylum, there is no reason
to espect every state to play an identical refugee
protection role. Some states will be willing to
provide temporary protection, but not be disposed to the permanent integration of refugees.
Traditional immigration countries could readily
serve as sites of permanent resettlement for
those refugees whose countries remain unsafe at
the end of the period of temporary protection.
Still other states will be in a position to admit
special needs cases that should be diverted from
the temporary protection system. There will
also be governments that assume a mi^ of these
roles, or which provide major financial or logstical support to the refugee protection system. A
renewed international refugee law based on this
kind of common but differentiated responsibility toward refugees would provide a pnncipled
yet flexible framework within which to reconcile the needs of refugees to the legitimate concerns of states.
Some will argue that a shift to equitable,
open-textured obligations would weaken international refugee law. This criticism does not
take into account, however, that the practical
value of formal refugee law has been decimated
by policies of non-cntrke and the containment of
refugees in their country of orign. I believe that
it is morally irresponsible to insist on the sanctity of traditional legal standards that we know
do not in fact constrain the self-interested conduct of states. If the international protection of
refugees is to be meaningfully regulated, then
we must temper the demands of moral criticality to meet the constraints of practical feasibility
International law is, after all, a consensual system of authority among states. If states are not
convinced that their interests are taken into
account by international refugee law, then in
practice - despite whatever formal standards
are proclaimed - international law will not
govern the way refugees are treated.
FOUI?~
and finally, the institutions of international refugee protection need to be retooled
to promote and coordinate a process of collectivized responsibility UNHCR's recent efforts to
prove its relevance to governments have, regrettably, lent credibility to the politics of non-entree
and to the containment of refugees. UNHCR
should instead focus on the development of
dependable mechanisms equitably to share-out
responsibility for the protection of refugees
among states. By proposing the standards and
mechanisms to implement common but differentiated responsibility toward refugees, UNHCR
could prove that international law is still an
effective framework within which to manage
involuntary migration.
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Critical Thinking is Required Now
Refugee law serves fewer and fewer peopl,
less and less well, as time goes on. Refugee In
as traditionally conceived is being undermint,
by a combination of non-cntrtc tactics and
disingenuous insistence of the "right to remai
We should seize the moment actively to
promote a new paradigm of refugee protectio
that is both human rights-based and pragmal
Refugee law should be redesigned to take
account of the legtimate state preoccupation:
that have undermined the value of law in
governing refugee protection, but without
compromising the essential commitment to
protection.
A renewed model of intemational refugee
law, built on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility, would allow mot
good to be done for more refugees than is
possible under the present regme. The small
minority of refugees that presently finds solid
protection in developed states may see a
reduction of its relative privileges under such
system, but a reduction in the Cadillacs of th~
few could, I believe, provide bicycles for the
many It is time to reconcile the need for a
secure and dignified refugee protection syster
to the legtimate interests of the countries in
which refugees are sheltered. Refugee law so
conceived would regain its relevance.
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